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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

for

the

above

captioned

matter

is

conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal
Michael

Murphy's

denial

from Third District Court, Judge
of

the

Defendant's

Petition

for

Modification for Change of Custody of the two minor children of
the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the Court err in its finding at the Petition

for Modification Hearing that there is no substantial change of
circumstances which would justify a consideration of a change in
custody?
2.

Did the Court err in failing to make sufficiently
4

detailed Findings of Fact with regard its analysis of whether
there was a substantial change of circumstances?
3.

Did the Court err in its finding that even if there

was a substantial change in circumstances, it would not be in the
best interest of the minor children of the parties to change
custody from their mother to their father?
3.

Did the Court err in failing to sustain counselfs

objection to hearsay evidence being presented?
4,

Did the Court err in denying the Defendant's Motion

for Amendment of Findings of Fact?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final order of the court denying
the Defendant Appellant's Petition of Modification and from a
final order of the court denying the Defendant Appellant's Motion
to Amend Findings.
1.

The relevant facts are as follows:

The parties were divorced on September 4, 1981.

Decree of Divorce.
2.

Two boys were born during the marriage:

Isaac

Pierce born July 7, 1978, and Isaiah Pierce born September 7,
1980.

Decree of Divorce.
3.

Custody of the two boys was awarded in a default

proceeding to the Plaintiff.
4.

Decree of Divorce.

The Plaintiff and children lived in Utah until

January of 1985, at which time she moved to Reno, Nevada without
prior notice to the Defendant, and without revealing her or the
5

children's whereabouts to the Defendant.

The Defendant located

her by driving to Reno and observing her car at her parentsf
residence.

Defendant hired a lawyer who verified through the

children's school records that the boys were residing in Reno.
The Plaintiff initiated no contacts with the Defendant until the
Defendant brought a Petition for Modification seeking custody of
the boys in 1985.
5.

Trial Transcript 55-56, 140.

The Court denied the Petition for Modification, but

awarded substantial summer visitation.

Order on Petition for

Modification.
6.
boy,

In May of 1986, the Plaintiff requested the older

Isaac, come

to

live with

the Defendant who had

remarried his present wife, Letha Pierce.

since

Isaac lived with the

Defendant from May 1986 until November of 1987 save a summer
visit in the summer of 1987. Trial Transcript, Page 145.
7.

In August of 1987, at the request of the younger

boy, Isaiah Pierce, the Plaintiff signed a stipulation agreeing
to change physical custody of both boys from herself to the
Defendant from July 1987 until July 1988.
8.

Stipulation.

Both parties petitioned the court for an order

changing custody based upon their stipulation, which the court
refused to do, instead granting "extended visitation" to the
Defendant.

Minute Entry.

9.

In November of 1987, without any prior notice, the

Defendant and his wife became aware that the Plaintiff intended
to remove the boys from the Defendant's physical custody, and
6

move them back to California where the Plaintiff and her husband
lived at the time.
10.

Trial Transcript, Pages 165-169.

The Plaintiff declined to provide her phone number

to the Defendant after she removed the boys from his physical
custody.

Trial Transcript, Page 202.
11.

The boys were sent to visit the Defendant during

the summer of 1988, and during this time the Defendant petitioned
the court for a change of custody.
12.

Petition for Modification.

A hearing was held on the Petition for Modifica-

tion on January 8.
appeal resulted.

The Defendant's Petition was denied and this

Order on Petition for Modification.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court ruled that there was not a substantial
change of circumstances which justified considering a change of
custody.

This was against the clear weight of the evidence and

was in error since the evidence presented at trial brought forth
many facts which supported a finding of a change of circumstances
under Utah law.

The most important change of circumstances was

the Plaintiff's relinquishment of physical custody of the minor
children to the Defendant for an extended period of time, then
her removal of the children from the Defendant without prior
warning.

The Plaintiff also demonstrated instability in numerous

moves, and deliberate refusal to provide her phone number to the
Defendant to allow him to contact the children by phone.

The

evidence also showed that the oldest boy was mature for his age,
and that he showed a strong desire to live with his father, which
7

the custody evaluator found to be in the best interests of both
boys.
The court also ruled that even if there was a change of
circumstances, it would not be in the best interests of the
children to change custody because of the younger boy's fear of
his stepmother.

This was error, and against the clear weight of

the evidence since the only evidence of the younger child's fear
was that it occurred subsequent to the

Defendant's Petition for

Modification and was the result of "programming" on the part of
the Plaintiff.

The youngest child, himself, asked to live with

the Defendant and his stepmother in 1987, and he demonstrated no
fear

to

the

custody

evaluator

or

to

the

Defendant's

and

Plaintiff's witnesses who had observed the youngest child with
the stepmother on numerous occasions.

In light of the custody

evaluator's recommendation of a change of custody, it was against
the clear weight of the evidence to find that it was not in the
best

interests

of

the

children

to

change

custody

to

the

Defendant.
In addition, the trial court failed to make adequate
findings articulating his basis for finding no substantial change
of circumstances.

The Court failed to discuss the prior award of

custody and it did not compare those findings with the evidence
presented at the hearing.

Therefore the findings are inadequate

as a matter of law.
The court also erred in allowing prejudicial hearsay
evidence

to

be

admitted

over
8

the

objections

of

Defendants

counsel.

This

testimony

presented

unfair

surprise

to

the

Defendant who was unable to cross-examine the witnesses referred
to by the Plaintiff.

There was no showing that the witnesses

were unavailable to testify in person.
Finally, the court erred in denying the Defendant's
Motion to Amend the Findings.

The Defendant's Motion to Amend

was based upon statements made by the judge in his ruling that
neither parent had committed abuse of the children or of step
children or foster children.
this

paragraph

in

the*

The Plaintiff did not object to

Defendant's

proposed

Findings,

and

therefore the judge should have granted the Defendant's Motion to
Amend

the

Findings

to

allow

conformance with his ruling.

addition

of

these

findings

in

Also, the Plaintiff included many

paragraphs in her Findings which were not supported by the weight
of the evidence and which were not part of the judge's ruling,
Therefore it was error to deny the Defendant's Motion to Amend
the Findings.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
IN
CIRCUMSTANCES.
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence on
the Defendant Appellant's Motion for Petition for Modification
for Change of Custody of the two minor children of the parties,
the court found that the Defendant had failed to show substantial
change of circumstances with regard to the situation of the
9

parties which would allow him to consider a custody change.

In

recent years, the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals
have articulated the specific types of changes which must exist
for the court to consider a change of custody.

This requirement

is to protect the child from "ping-pong" custody awards and the
"accompanying

instability

so

damaging

to

a

child's

proper

development."

Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1987).

The threshold for finding a change of circumstances is high "to
discourage
decrees."

frequent
Id.

petitions

for

modification

of

custody

The case of Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah

1984) delineated the specific changes which may be considered as
a change of circumstances; in the Becker case the court held that
changes

in the noncustodial parent's situation should not be

considered

a

"substantial

modification of custody.

change

of

circumstances"

for

Id. at 610.

Concurring opinions of Justice Stewart and Howe in the
Kramer

case,

however,

cautioned

the

court

that

a

strict

application of the Kramer analysis would in some circumstances
result in decisions which would be contrary to the best interests
of the child.

Kramer at 629.

Justice Stewart's and Howefs

concurring opinions in Kramer have been heeded in recent case
law, such as Fullmer v. Fullmer. 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988)e
The case of Mauahan v. Maughan. 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), however, held that in situations where custody was
not carefully examined in the first instance, a less rigid change
of circumstances inquiry is allowed, and the court may accept a
10

greater range of evidence under Hogge's

first prong, including

"the events which transpired since the original award," and the
"resulting effects on the child."
In

light

of

the

Maughan at 160.

proliferating

standards

for

determining whether there has been a change of circumstances, it
must

first

be

determined

which

standard

is the

appropriate

standard to apply in a petition for modification case—the rigid
Kramer

standard

which

limits

the

asserted

changes

to

be

considered to
...those which have some material relationship to and
substantial €>ffect on the parenting ability of the
functioning of the presently existing custodial
relationship...
Kramer at 626 quoting Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982),
or the less restrictive standard set forth in the Maughan case.
It is submitted that in the case at bar, the Maughan standard is
more appropriate for the reason that the minor children involved
have been subjected to "ping-pong" custody arrangements by the
Plaintiff herself when she voluntarily sent the oldest son, Isaac
to live with the Defendant for the 86-87 school year, agreed in
writing that both boys would remain with their father for an
additional year, and then contrary to her agreement, removed both
children from the custody of the Defendant without warning in the
middle of the school year.

It was precisely this ping-pong

physical custody arrangement, along with the strong desires of
the oldest child, which motivated the Defendant to seek a change
in

custody.

To

change

custody

from

the

Plaintiff

to the

Defendant is quite a different situation where the children have
11

previously spent extended periods of time with the Defendant, and
where the Plaintiff had voluntarily agreed to such arrangements.
Another grounds for finding that the Maughan standard
rather than the Kramer standard is applicable to the case at bar
is that

the prior petition

for modification

brought by the

Defendant did not result in findings indicating that the court
thoroughly examined various factors pertaining to the childrenfs
welfare.

The fact that no findings were made with regard to the

children's best interests allows a wider range of evidence under
Hoggefs first prong regarding "the initial custody arrangement,
the events that have since transpired, and the resulting effects
on the child."

Maughan at 160.

A third ground for applying a more relaxed standard to
the substantial change of circumstances requirement is submitted
by the Defendant for the reason that it would serve the best
interests
standard

of

the

to

children

cases

of

involving

divorce
changes

to
in

expand

the

Kramer

circumstances

which

affect the children's access to and relationship with their noncustodial parent.
secure

in the

Too often a vindictive

knowledge that district

custodial parent,

courts

rarely

find a

custodial parent in contempt for failure to allow visitation,
systematically

refuse

visitation,

campaign

to

alienate

the

children from their noncustodial parent, and make their living
arrangements such that geographical distance and will prevent
frequent visitation.
A

custodial

parent's
12

behavior

in

attempting

to

restrict visitation, whether by refusal to allow visitation or by
simply moving away from the noncustodial parent, is a change of
circumstances which drastically affects the child's well-being.
Research has clearly demonstrated the importance of the childfs
access to both parents after divorce*
a

higher

risk

for

suicide,

Children of divorce are at

juvenile

delinquency,

pregnancy, failure in school, and health problems•
World Report, November 28, 1983 pgs. 57-62.

teenage

U.S. News &

The single most

important factor which has been found to alleviate the pain and
stress children experience in a divorce situeition has been found
to be

regular and

frequent contact with both parents.

See

Jacobson, The Impact of Marital Separation/Divorce on Children, 1
J.

Divorce 341

higher

the

(1978), which documents a study

loss

of

time

with

maladjustment of the child."

the

father,

Id. at 339.

finding

the

"the

higher

the

See also B. Garfinkel

and H. Golombek, The Adolescent and Mood Disturbance, 2 04, 2 05.
(1983),

E.M.

Personality

Heatherington,

Effects

of

Father

Absence

on

Development in Adolescent Daughters, Developmental

Psychology Vol. 7, pgs. 313-326 (1972), H. Biller, Father and Sex
Role

(1971),

and

J.

Cortes,

Delinquency

and

Crime,

A

Biopsychosocial Approach. (1972).
One of the longest range studies ever done on the
effects

of

divorce

upon

children, was

a ten year

study

in

California which found that the only children who were relatively
happy

following their parent's divorce, were those who could

visit their noncustodial

parent daily with
13

the approval and

permission of their custodial parent.
Divorced, (1983).

L. Francke, Growing up

Another five year study of children of divorce

found that "regular, frequent visitation" with the noncustodial
parent

was

the

"key

children of divorce.
Breakup,

page

factor" contributing

to the success of

J. Wallerstein and J. Kelly, Surviving the

328,(1980).

This

same

study

determined

that

approximately one fifth of the custodial parents participating in
the study

saw no value in visitation and actively tried to

sabotage the child's visits with the noncustodial parent. Id.

In

light of the well-documented importance of contact between the
child and the noncustodial parent, the custodial parent's actions
in attempting to thwart frequent and regular contact with the
noncustodial parent must be considered in any determination of a
change of circumstances in order to fully protect the children of
divorce

in

Utah.

Therefore,

this

court

should

modify

the

standards set forth in Maughan to include the custodial parentf s
actions in facilitating or thwarting visitation as evidence to be
considered a substantial change of circumstances.
Here, the evidence at trial revealed many facts which
under Utah case law constitute a change of circumstances even
under the more restrictive Kramer standards.
First of all, the undisputed evidence presented at the
hearing on the Petition for Modification was that the two minor
boys involved in this case had been subject to numerous moves
and school transfers since the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Mrs.

Wehry

/

testified

that

since
14

the

date of the Decree of

Divorce, the oldest child, Isaac, had attended 7 schools—2 in
Salt Lake City, 3 in Reno, 1 in Eureka, and 1 in Chico.

Since

the Petition for Modification, he attended 5 schools—3 in Reno,
1 in Eureka, and 1 in Chico.
194, lines 5-8.
children's

Ms. Wehry was unable to provide stability in the

environment,

friendships

Testimony of Marcelene Wehry, page

and

necessarily

familiar

forcing

circumstances.

them

She

was

to

abandon

unable to

provide continuity in their education environment subjecting them
to different curriculums, and on at least one occasion, as set
forth below, forcing them to change schools in the middle of the
school year.
In addition to the numerous moves on the part of
the Plaintiff, the parties agreed to a physical change in custody
for Isaac for the 86-87 school year, and then a physical change
in custody for Isaiah so that both boys would reside with their
father in 87-88.
in

school

in

Just three months after the boys were enrolled

Utah

and

pursuant

Defendant

custody

of both

Plaintiff

removed

the

boys

boys

to
for

the

stipulation

the year

from their

father

of

giving

87-88, the

in an abrupt,

unplanned, and unnecessary custody change, totally without notice
or warning to the Defendant and to the children.

The court-

ordered custody evaluator, Dr. Lewis Morse testified that such a
move would have a destabilizing effect upon the children as seen
from the following quote:
Q.

Do you have an opinion as to
whether it had a positive or a
negative effect on the boys for the
Wherys [sic] to send the boys to
15

live in Utah, and then remove them
a few months later with no warning?
A.

In my opinion, I would think that
that would have an unstabilizing
and confusing effect on the boys.

Testimony of Dr. Lewis Morse, Pages 22-23.
The case of Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320, 1321
(Utah

1986) dealt with a situation where the noncustodial parent

had assumed physical custody of the child for a majority of the
time since the divorce.

The custodial parent had moved seven

times since the decree was entered and did not exhibit the same
stability

the

noncustodial

parent

demonstrated.

The

Utah

Supreme Court found that failure to assume the role of custodial
parent was a material change of circumstances which warrants the
reopening

of the question

noncustodial

parent

of custody, particularly

provided

the

residence and stable home life.

child

with

a

when the
permanent

Id.

The case at bar is very similar to the Hirsch case.
this

case,

as

set

forth

above,

the

Plaintiff

In

voluntarily

relinquished custody to the noncustodial parent, splitting up the
children for one year, and then agreeing to relinquish custody of
both children for another year.
from

the

children

Defendant's
to

much

care,

instability

She then removed the children

without
in

warning,

conjunction

relocations of the childrens1 residence.
other

hand,

offered

the children

subjecting
with

her

the
many

The Defendant, on the

stability

and

a chance to

enhance the close bond that existed between the children and
their father and his family.
16

Under the Hirsch case the court

below

clearly

erred

in

finding

no

substantial

change

of

circumstances.
The Plaintiff also testified that after removing the
boys unexpectedly

from their father in November of 1987, she

changed her phone number.

It was her intention to deprive the

Pierces of her phone number from November of 1987 until June of
1988.

This prevented the Pierces from having contact with the

minor children of the parties.
page 193, lines 3-9.

Testimony of Marcelene Pierce,

This action on the part of the Plaintiff

prevented the Defendant from initiating calls to his sons, and
unnecessarily restricted the boys' telephone contact with their
father.

The court itself, after reviewing the telephone records,

questioned the Plaintiff as to why no calls were made to the
children's father in the month of May, 1988 in the following
exchange:
Q.

Why were there no phone calls made
to Mr. Pierce in May of 88. There
were no phone calls made to--

A.

Probably because I didn't encourage
the children to call.
I don't
know.

Q,

Why didn't you encourage them to
call?

A.

I don't know. They were leaving on
June 20th and we had arranged for
visitation to begin that day.
I
don't know why there were no calls
in May, I was kind of surprised
when I looked at the bill myself.

Testimony of Marcelene Wehry, pages 202, 203.
The Plaintiff's behavior in this instance demonstrated
17

irresponsibility
children.

and disregard

for the best interests of the

In light of the large body of research documenting the

importance of contact between children and their non-custodial
parent, this court should
custodial

parent's

find, as a matter of law, that a

attempts

to

restrict

contact

should

be

considered to reflect her parenting ability and the functioning
of the custodial relationship.
While moving numerous times alone may not be sufficient
to justify a change of circumstances, a change of custody for
over a year, which separated the minor children of the parties, a
plan to reunite the children in the physical custody of their
father and then disruption of that plan with no warning, is
certainly
custody.

a

change

of

circumstances

justifying

review

of

The fact that the boys have moved often and that there

was a substantial period of time when the boys were denied calls
initiated by their father because of the Plaintiff decision to
deprive Defendant from having her telephone number, compounds
the difficulties for the boys and clearly establishes a change of
circumstances.
A second change of circumstances which should have been
recognized by the court as a substantial change of circumstances
was the fact that Isaac wanted to live with his father for
several years, and at the time of the Petition for Modification
he had experienced the opportunity to live with his father for a
year, and had attained a sufficient degree of maturity, both
emotional and chronological, to appreciate the consequences of a
18

permanent change of custody.

In this case, the court-ordered

custody evaluator testified that Isaac had
desire to live with his father.
page 15, lines 20-22.

firmly stated his

Testimony of Dr. Louis Morse,

He also testified that Isaac was mature

for his age, was intelligent and creative.
Id, page 16, lines 5-7.
The custody evaluator expanded upon his perception of
Isaac's desire to live with his father when he testified as
follows:
Now Isaac has been adamant about
living with his father for two
reasons: one is the person of the
father and the personal relationship between him and his father
and the lifestyle of his father.
The lifestyle of the father is
rural, and he prefers to have a
rural lifestyle himself.
Q.

Do you have an opinion as to which
element is stronger in Isaac's
preference* to live with his father?

A.

Well, he made many statements
regarding his relationship—many
positive statements regarding his
relationship with his father. The
most positive one is the one I put
into the report, where he said, "I
love my father more than anybody
else on earth."

Testimony of Dr. Louis Morse, page 20, lines 11-2 3.
The

evidence

also

indicated

that

forcing

Isaac to

return to his mother against his will affected him in such a
negative way as to cause him physical pain.
testified

Isaac's stepmother

of the following event which occurred

at the time

Isaac was to return from his extended summer visitation with his
19

father:
...I says to Isaac, I says, "come
on, letfs go." And he started
doubling with pain and started
crying and he said his stomach
hurt and he didn't want to go. And
I had to sit with him on the front
steps for about 15 minutes with my
arm around him. And I was rubbing
his back and telling him that this
would be okay, and that he was
strong and that he would get
through this. And we got into the
car and we picked up my sister and
my
nephew
and
we went
to
California.
Testimony of Letha Pierce, page 120, lines 22-25, and page 121,
lines 1-6.
The Utah Supreme Court case of Finnecran v. Finnegan,
535 P. 2d 1159 (Utah

1975) found that a mature childfs desire to

change physical custody justified a change in custody to allow
the child to live with the parent of his choice.
Under Utah case law, and in light of the testimony at
the hearing, the

court

erred

in

finding that there was no

substantial change of circumstances.
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT IT WAS IN THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN TO REMAIN WITH
THEIR MOTHER BECAUSE OF ISAIAH'S FEAR OF HIS
STEPMOTHER.
Having

found

there

was

no

substantial

change

of

circumstances, the Court ruled that even if there were found to
be a substantial change of circumstances, it would not be in the
best interests of the children to change custody stating the
following reasons:
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. . .it's my belief based on the evidence
that I heard and the interviews with the
children that it still would not be in the
best interest of the children to change
custody if for no other reason that this:
Isaiah's feelings about his step-mother may
not be justified^ but he has those feelings,
nevertheless, and thates fairly clear from
the interview with him* It seems to me that
based on the evidence and based on the
interviews, that Isaac would be better able
to adapt to the proposition that he cannot be
with his father as the custodial parent
better than Isaiah could adapt to being away
from his mother as the custodial parent.
Both sets of parents and step-parents
need to work with Isaiah on this.
And I'm not seeing anything negatively,
Mr. Pierce, but not only the clear impression
I got, but expressly from Isaac, not from
Isaiah but from Isaac, that he has the
feeling that maybe Isaiah is not picked on
exactly, but there is more discipline from
Letha with respect to Isaiah than there is
with respect to him. And that's because it's
his belief that he is so associated with you
that the discipline in your house with
respect to Isaac is your discipline, not
Letha's.
And he thinks that is not the case with
respect to Isaiah, and the way it comes out
is this, he says, that, "If Letha did
anything with me, my dad would step in. But
it's not the same with respect to Isaiah."
You know, I'm sure that your effort is
that when the children are with you to have
even-handed justice, and I assume that's what
occurs.
But their perception of it is not
that way, and I'm not so concerned with Isaac
because he sees what he sees and he is
willing to say it. But Isaiah did not say
that, but it may be what he is thinking and
never expressing it.
It's just a problem
that ought to be addressed.
Ruling of the Court, pages 3-4.
From this speech, the Court's reasoning with regard to
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the best interests of the children is not easily discerned, but
the salient points seem to be that the younger child, Isaiah
Pierce,

was afraid of his stepmother, and because of this Isaac

would be better able to adjust to not living with his father than
Isaiah would be able to adjust to not living with his mother.
Although the court mention "disparate treatment" of the two boys,
he

also

said

"Ifm

sure that

your

effort

is that when the

children are with you to have even-handed justice, and I assume
that's what occurs."

Id,

(Emphasis added.)

This statement

indicates that he did not believe disparate treatment actually
occurred, apparently leaving the issues of Isaiah's fear as the
only reason why he did not feel it was in the childrens' best
interests to have custody transferred

to their

father.

The

court's finding that the best interests of the Pierce children
required

that

custody

remain

with

their

mother

because

of

Isaiah's fear was against the clear weight of the evidence, as
can be

seen by

examination of the testimony

of the various

witnesses, including the Plaintiff's witness, and the Plaintiff's
own testimony.
The court-ordered evaluator interviewed the children
the day he testified in trial, and testified that Isaiah's fear
of Letha was the result of "programming" by the Plaintiff and her
husband rather than upon fact:
My interpretation of this
entire situation is that while
Isaiah says, "I am scared to be in
Utah to be with Letha," that that
fright is not based on fact, and I
believe both families in this case
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have tried to influence the
children to their point of view.
And I think that at least part, in
my opinion, of his impression of
being afraid of Letha is due to the
influence that he receives from his
parents in Chico [the Plaintiff and
her husband]c
Testimony of Dr. Lewis Morse, page 17, lines 14-21.
The custody evaluator, Dr. Morse, expanded upon his
basis for believing that Isaiah's fear was not based on fact in
the following exchange.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

What is the basis for that
opinion,
Say it again please?
What is the basis for your
opinion, that part of his
fright is based upon the
influence of the Chico family?
By all accounts the boy is
immature. His mother in Chico
stated expressly that he is
moldable and he changes his
story
according
to
the
circumstances. And he has—you
know, he has lied to me.
Can you think of a specific example
of what he has lied to you about?
Yes.
In Chico I asked him,
"Does your mother ever refuse
to let you call your father on
the phone?"
And he said,
"yes*"
I asked him the same
question this morning, and he
said, "No." So in one of those
cases he was not telling me
the truth.

Id. at pages 17-18.
Dr. Morse took into consideration Isaiah's fear of his
stepmother in recommending what custody arrangement would best
serve the interests of the Pierce boys. He testified that because
Isaiah's fear was not substantiated and was not in proportion to
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reality, he was still of the opinion that it would serve the
best interests of the boys to be placed in the custody of their
father.

Testimony of Dr. Morse, page 41, lines 1-5.
Other facts and statements by witnesses leave no other

conclusion but that Isaiahfs fear was based upon "programming" by
the Plaintiff rather than being based upon reality.
Probably the strongest indication of the fact that
Isaiah's fear was not based on reality is his statement to the
custody evaluator during summer visitation, that he wanted to
live with his father.

It was not until he returned to live with

his mother

fear was

that his

first expressed,

and he then

changed his mind and stated he wanted to live with his mother.
Isaiah, the younger boy, when I
interviewed him in Eureka, he opted
for living with his father. When I
interviewed him in Chico, he opted
to live with his mother.
Today
when I saw him briefly, he said he
wished to live with his mother.
Testimony of Dr. Louis Morse, page 15, lines 20-25, page 16,
lines 1-2.
Obviously, Isaiah's fears of his stepmother were not
based on reality because at the time he was living in her care
and physical custody for extended visitation of 60 days, he did
not show any discomfort or fear whatsoever.

When questioned at

that time by the evaluator about his relationship with Letha, he
stated he got along with Letha "pretty good." Testimony of Dr.
Louis Morse, page 17, lines 10-13.
The testimony of the Plaintiff herself establishes that
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Isaiah had

no

fear of his

father.

It was the Plaintiff§s

testimony that Isaiah came to her and asked her to go live with
his father.

Obviously he had no fear at that time of living with

his father and stepmother.
...Isaiah came to me and he said,
"I want to go spend a year with
dad."
And I said, you know, I
told them, well, I gave Isaac a
year so I felt like I had to give
Isaiah a year too.
Testimony of Marcelene Wehry, page 145, lines 7-11.
Many witnesses observed the interactions between Isaiah
and his stepmother, Letha Pierce, including the Plaintiff's own
witnesses

who

observed

an

easy-going,

friendly,

loving

relationship between the boys and their st€>pmother without any
indication of fear whatsoever.

The Plaintiff's witness, Peggy Nc

Rogers, testified that she had known Isaac and Isaiah for 9
years.

She testified that she had seen the boys interact with

their stepmother and father and that,
...They seem real happy with them,
especially Isaac.
Isaiah is just
very fond of his mother and I think
he is just a little bit uneasy with
Letha just because he wants to be
with his mother.
But he is not,
you know he is not—I don't feel
like he feels like he is being
threatened to the point of fear
anything like that.
Testimony of Peggy Rogers, Page 133.
The Defendant testified that Isaicih's relationship was
close to his stepmother:
From what I see it's a very, ve^j
close and loving relationship.
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He's always running up to give her
hugs and likes to cuddle up next to
her# sit on her lap. Very close
relationship.
Testimony of Terry Pierce page 74, line 25, and page 75, lines
1-3.
Dr. Harold J. Shaw, Jr., a witness for the Defendant,
who has a master's degree in Educational Administration and a
doctor's degree in Educational Administration, and was principal
of Tintic High School for 6 years, testified that he had been
acquainted with Terry and Letha Pierce for 8 years.

He testified

that he had observed them in his capacity as community member,
church member, and as principal of the school their daughter Amy
attended.

He testified that he observed them in school and at

home at parties.
in the community."

"Just about every life situation you could have
Testimony of Dr. Shaw, page 97, lines 2-24.

Dr. Shaw testified that he observed Letha and Terry
Pierce, Isaac and Isaiah, and that he observed,
They played a lot. They had a good
time. They had a warm and loving
relationship. I think they like to
cuddle up to Letha a lot in church.
Testimony of Dr. Shaw, page 102, lines 1-7.
The question was asked, did you ever see any evidence
of Isaiah being afraid of Letha?

Answer, "never, no."

How many

opportunities did you have to observe Letha and Isaiah together?
Answer, "Oh, at least 20 or more."

Testimony of Dr. Shaw, page

102, lines 8-13.
The Plaintiff did not produce one witness who could
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testify, from personal experience, of fear existing on the part
of Isaiah prior to the Petition

for Modification

of Custody

Hearing, nor could she produce any witness who could testify,
from personal

experience, of any

incident which would

cause

Isaiah to fear his stepmother.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the Court's finding
the best interest of the minor children mandated that they remain
with their mother is against the clear weight of the evidencec
Most importantly, it was contrary to the finding of the courtsordered custody evaluator who recommended that the best interest
of the children would be served by giving permanent custody of
them to their father.

In addition, the court failed to examine

the Findings of Fact rendered by the judge at the prior Petition
for Modification.
(Ct. App. Utah

The case of Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436

1989) requires that the court must discuss the

evidence offered in support of a Petition for Modification of
custody,

and

must

compare

the

underlying the original award.
bench

evidence

with

the

factors

The court's comments from the

in the modification hearing must explain the reasoning

behind the denial of the petition.
that case

failed to establish

Id. , at 438.

sufficient

The court in

factual grounds to

conclude whether a change of circumstances had been demonstrated.
The case was remanded
behind

the

modification.

prior

for articulation of the considerations

award

of

custody

and

the

order

denying

Id. at 439.

The case at bar is identical to the Jensen case in its
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lack of adequate findings.

The court did not articulate the

considerations behind the initial award of custody nor the order
denying modification.
insufficient

Here, like the Jensen case, there are

factual grounds expressed

to conclude whether a

change of circumstances has been demonstrated.
III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT
At the hearing on the Petition for Modification, the
Plaintiff attempted to justify her removal of the two children
from the Defendant's physical custody in contravention of the
stipulation she entered granting the Defendant physical custody
of the boys for a year.

The Plaintiff testified of numerous

conversations with various individuals, in which she claimed to
have

been

told

information which

caused

her to believe her

children would be placed in foster care, therefore, necessitating
her

picking

up

the

children.

conversations with Dixie Trinkle.
pages

162-164,

Bruce

Schofied,

The

Plaintiff

testified

to

Testimony of Marcelene Wehry,
Id.

at pages

164-165, Mr.

Grimsted, Id. at pages 153-156 and Mrs. Jessop Id. at pages 156160.
The
related

over

instance.
transcript.

court
the

allowed

objections

the
of

hearsay

conversations

Defendant's

counsel

to be

in each

See pages 162, 164, 153, and 156 of the hearing
This was error under Utah law as can be seen from

the Utah case of Butler v.Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969).
that case the trial court sustained
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In

an objection to hearsay

evidence where the witnesses were available.

Like the Butler

case, the Plaintiff, in the case at bar, made no showing as to
why the actual witnesses could not testify,.

Her self-serving

statements seeking to justify her actions after the fact are
highly suspicious and do not afford the court the opportunity to
evaluate

the

witness 1

credibility

or

reliability.

The

Plaintiff's testimony was extremely prejudicial to the Defendant,
as he had no prior notice of her intention to quote witnesses not
in the courtroom, and therefore, he did not have the opportunity
to subpoena them and subject them to cross-examination.

The

testimony with regard to conversations with witnesses was also
prejudicial in that it seemed to justify, at least in part, the
Plaintiff's hasty

actions

in contravening

her stipulation to

leave custody with the Defendant for a year, when in reality, she
may have had no justification.
Plaintiff

subjected

the

In spite of the fact that the

children

to

"ping-pong"

custody

arrangements without notice or warning, the trial court found
that no change of circumstances had occurred.

His finding in

this regard seems to have ignored the "ping-pong" custody issue
in

large

part

because

of

the

Plaintiff's

conversations seemingly justifying her actions.

testimony

of

Based upon the

Butler case, Defendant's counsel's objections to hearsay should
not have been overruled.

This case should be remanded

further hearing in conformance with the Butler case.
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for

IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AMEND THE FINDINGS
AS PER THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS
The

Defendant

made

a

timely

motion

to

amend

the

Findings to include statements made by the trial judge in his
ruling from the bench after presentation of the evidence, and to
eliminate other statements not made in his ruling.
The Court's ruling included the following statements:
I specifically find there has been no
abuse of these two boys by either natural
parent or by either step-parent.
I also specifically find, for the
purposes of this Court, without intending to
undercut a finding and determination by
another agency or another Court concerning
Amy, but with respect to this Court I find
that there was no abuse of Amy.
Furthermore I find that there was no
abuse of the foster child, Steven Slater.
Ruling of the Court, page 2, lines 3-12.
In light of this language, Defendant submitted its own
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and included
that language in it.

The Plaintiff objected to the Defendants

proposed findings but did not object to that specific language.
Therefore, it was error for the judge to deny the Defendants
Motion to Amend the Findings to include that language.

The

Defendant's Motion to Amend Findings also objected to Plaintiff!s
paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

As can be seen from the Courtf s

ruling, these matters were simply not discussed.
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The Court

should have granted the Defendant's Motion to Amend in light of
that fact.
With regard to paragraph 8, the Court did not find that
Isaiah's fears were concrete, real and pervasive and provided
instead as follows:
Isaiah's feelings about his stepmother may
not be justified, but he has those feelings,
nevertheless, and that's fairly clear from
the interview with him.
Ruling of the Court, page 3, lines 6-8.
To find that Isaiah's feelings were "concrete, real and
pervasive" is not supported by the evidence, and, therefore, the
Court should have granted the Motion to Amend Findings.

In light

of the discrepancy between the Court's ruling and the Plaintiffrs
proposed

Findings

of

Fact, and

in light

of the

Defendants

objections, the Court should have granted the Defendant's Motion
to Amend.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments and case law set forth above,
the Defendant respectfully requests that this court reverse the
Findings of the lower court and enter a finding that there is a
substantial change of circumstances, and that it is in the best
interests of the children to change custody from the Plaintiff to
the Defendant.
the

case

be

In the alternative the Defendant requests that
remanded

for proper

findings

to be entered

conformance with Utah law, and that the findings be amended as
prayed for by the Defendant in his Motion to Amend.
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